More unequal we stand? Inequality in the United States from the Great Recession to the COVID pandemic

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Views are of the authors and not necessarily of the Minneapolis Fed or the Federal Reserve System



- Heathcote, Perri Violante (RED, 2010) document dynamics of several dimensions of inequality in the United States from 1967 to 2006, using publicly available surveys
- Document dynamics of dimensions of inequality in the United States over past 15 years (which include Great Recession and COVID)
- Provide empirical references to the micro-macro literature

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Organizing device: household budget constraint

$$c + a' = a + \sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i h_i + U + T^G - \tau$$

- w_i individual wage
- w_ih_i individual earnings (labor supply)
- $\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i h_i$ hh earnings (pooling)
- $\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i h_i + U$ hh market income (unearned income)
- $\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i h_i + U + T^G$ hh pretax income (govt transfers)
- $\sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i h_i + T^G + U \tau$ hh disposable income (taxes)
- a' end of period wealth (capital gains, saving)
- c consumption expenditures

Five Surveys

- 1. Current Population Survey (March CPS), 1967-2021
 - repeated cross-section (+short panel), ≃60,000 households per year: income
- 2. American Community Survey (ACS), 2000-2020
 - repeated cross-section, ≃1m households per year: income

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- 3. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), 1980-2021
 - rotating short panel: ≃15,000 households: income, consumption, wealth

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- 3. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), 1980-2021
 - rotating short panel: ≃15,000 households: income, consumption, wealth
- 4. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 67-96, 98(2)18
 - long panel, \simeq 6000 households: income, consumption, wealth
- 5. Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), 1988(3)2018
 - repeated cross section, ${\simeq}4000$ households: income and wealth

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Sample selection

1. Sample A

- "Clean" version of raw data: drop households with members that have incomplete or implausible info (i.e. wage below 1/2 the minimum)
- used for population-level statistics (comparison with NIPA)

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- 2. Sample B
 - Households in A with at least one member age 25-60
 - used for household-level (earnings, income, consumption) statistics
- 3. Sample C
 - individuals from households B, age 25-60 who work at least 260 hours per year
 - used for individual-level (wages, hours) statistics

Macro facts in micro data (DNA)

Wage and salary income pc, sample A

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March CPS matches NIPA well

Wage and salary income pc, sample A



- March CPS matches NIPA well
- Broad agreement with NIPA for other surveys
- In PSID & CE more persistent Great Recession

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Pretax (personal) income pc, sample A



Pretax Income includes: earnings, business income, capital income, transfers, FICA

Gaps between NIPA and surveys (CPS)



- NIPA pretax income 20% larger than CPS pretax
- Gap larger in GR and COVID



gap in transfers small on average, large in recessions

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- gap in capital and business income always large
- later assess inequality impact of gaps

Consumption expenditures pc, sample A Non Durables Durables



Non health, non housing

- recent years allow evaluation of PSID v/s CE
- CE better matches NIPA growth in recent years and closer to NIPA than PSID

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both capture cyclical variations (COVID?)

400 ŝ Fhousands 2012 350 300 Flow of Funds 250 SCF 200 150 100 50 0 983 1985

Household net worth pc, sample A

- gap between surveys and FoF
- PSID \approx SCF except during equity booms
- CE wealth very low

Inequality dynamics roadmap

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- individual wages \rightarrow
- individual earnings \rightarrow
- HH earnings/income \rightarrow
- HH expenditures and wealth

Wage inequality, sample C, CPS 4.5 Top 10%/Mid 10% 4 3.5 Ratio 3 Mid 10%/Bottom 10% 2.5 2

- not cyclical
- flat at the bottom
- post GR: keeps increasing at the top

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Wage premia



Wage premia



Wage premia



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post GR: end of the rise in college premium

Wage gaps



post GR: further closing (at slower pace) of gender gap

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little change in race gap

Gender gaps across the wage distribution





over past 15 years

- increase in inequality at top both for men and women
- largest gender gap at the top

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Measures of men earnings: sample B



Earnings Gender Gaps



- 1967-1997: women faster wage and hours growth: great earnings equalization
- 1997-2020: hours equalization over, wage equalization slower
- Gender gap in hours AND wages around 25%

From individuals to households

Measures of household income: Sample B, CPS, by mkt



Household inequality: Sample B



- Great Recession drove an increase in inequality, which has reversed at the bottom, not at the top
- COVID recession unprecedented redistribution

Main takeaways

 Market income of bottom 20% of households still at 1967 level (after the GR boost and boom)

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Main takeaways

- Market income of bottom 20% of households still at 1967 level (after the GR boost and boom)
- Tax and transfers greatly affect trend and cycle of bottom 20%, and reduce income at the top
- Over past 15 years disposable income of the top keeps diverging

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COVID historically large redistribution

Assessing the impact of missing income in CPS

- CPS might miss substantial fraction of capital and business income and, during COVID, transfers
- assess inequality impact by rescaling CPS figures by the avge NIPA/CPS ratio in income category
- rescaling is not uniform across households because many households report 0

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Check: Share of top 10%



 Rescaling capital income has significant impact on both level and trend of inequality at the top

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- missing capital inc underestimates ineq. level & growth
- missing transfers overestimates ineq. in covid
- overall ineq. trend over past 15 years not much affected

Household Expenditure Inequality: Sample B, CE



Dynamics of income inequality in CE very similar to CPS

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- Still no increase in expenditure inequality
- Same results using PSID expenditures

Wealth Inequality: Sample B



- Dynamics of wealth inequality driven by house and stock prices (Kuhn et al. 2020)
- In recent years (still missing COVID data in SCF and PSID) wealth inequality declining (raising home prices?)

Earnings Volatility



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- COVID: historically different, first recession when disposable income inequality declined
- Consumption expenditure inequality still flat throughout
- Wealth inequality increase around great recession, declines after